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Abstract 
 
DECONSTRUCTING ANESTHESIA HANDOFFS DURING SIMULATED 
INTRAOPERATIVE ANESTHESIA CARE 
By Jason S. Lowe, Ph.D., CRNA 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2015. 
Major Director:  Clarence Biddle, PhD, CRNA 
Department of Nurse Anesthesia 
 
 
Anesthesia patient handoffs are a vulnerable time for patient care and handoffs occur 
frequently during anesthesia care.  Communication failures contribute to patient harm 
during anesthesia patient handoffs.   The Joint Commission has recognized the 
potential for communication failure during patient handoffs and has recommended 
processes to improve handoff safety.  Handoffs are made more difficult by latent 
conditions such as time constraints, pressure and distractions, which often result in 
incomplete or inaccurate handoff reports.  This nonexperimental, correlation study 
identified the latent conditions that occur during the handoff process and their 
relationship to the quality of the handoff.  This research shows an inverse relationship 
between latent conditions and anesthesia patient handoff scores.  The number of latent 
	  	  
conditions and the types of latent conditions affected handoff scores. Handoffs that 
were not interactive or handoffs with unsafe timing predictably resulted in poor handoff 
communication.  Clinicians must acknowledge that handoffs are a high-risk event that 
can result in patient harm. Clear and effective communication is key to safe, quality care 
and this includes being aware of and minimizing the impact of latent conditions during 
the anesthesia patient handoff.   
	  	   1	  
 
 
Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
Hospitals are institutions that provide medical and surgical treatment and nursing 
care for sick or injured people.  People go to hospitals for care to improve or at least 
maintain their health.  Unfortunately, every day patients are harmed by medical errors in 
these same hospitals.  Despite the goals of providing safe and effective patient care, 
hospitals are not as safe as they should be.  In fact, healthcare is considered unsafe 
(Leape et al, 2009). 
Medical errors are an ongoing problem in health care. Medical errors are defined 
as “the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended (i.e. error of execution) 
or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (error of planning)” (Kohn et al, 2000).  
One noted patient safety expert likened the problem of medical errors to a public health 
epidemic (Eisenberg et al, 2000).  Health care organizations, government, professional 
associations and others have come together to create a patient safety movement to 
improve healthcare and decrease medical errors (Clancy, 2009).   
The National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) identifies some of the most 
common and worrisome sources of medical errors as: wrong-site surgery, medication 
errors, health-care acquired infections, falls, readmissions and diagnostic errors.  The 
causes of medical errors are complex.  One thought is that humans are prone to error.  
This is the human component, which acknowledges that even intelligent, well-intention 
healthcare providers make mistakes.  A systems centered approach to error is a 
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different way of thinking about errors.  Systems approach assumes that humans are 
fallible and that systems must be designed that prevents humans from making errors 
(van Beuzekom, 2010).  In the enlightened age of error theory, theorists are focusing 
their attention on system engineering, shifting the focus from the individual blame to 
system improvement.   
Many healthcare systems fit Reason’s description of “sick system syndrome.”  
These “sick” healthcare systems are hierarchical and lack mutual respect, teamwork 
and transparency (Leape et al, 2009).  Solutions that create a safer healthcare system 
and decrease medical errors are centered around system fixes.  The Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) is a government supported agency whose 
mission is to produce evidence to make health care safer, higher quality, more 
accessible, equitable, and affordable.  The AHRQ recommends the following to prevent 
and reduce medical errors: creating a culture of safety, encouraging teamwork, reducing 
healthcare-associated infections, advances in event reporting, supporting patient safety 
training and understanding resident fatigue. 
All patient care areas are at risk of causing harm to patients.  The operating room 
has been identified as a particularly dangerous area of the hospital.  Kohn (2000) stated 
that high error rates with serious consequences are more likely in intensive care units, 
operating rooms, and emergency departments.  More than half of the medical errors 
occurring in the hospital are attributed to the operating room (de Vries et al, 2008). 
Effective communication in this environment is identified as essential to ensure the safe 
delivery of surgical care (Hu et al,  2012). 
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When medical errors occur, a common cause is communication breakdown 
between members of the healthcare team (Gawande et al, 2003).  Communication 
breakdown or failure occurs in the care of patients when relevant patient information is 
not transferred to other health care providers or when incorrect patient information is 
transferred. Communication failures can occur during any point in the continuum of 
patient care.  One of the most vulnerable times for communication failure is when the 
patient care is transferred from one provider to another. 
A patient “handoff” is a term used to describe the transfer of role and responsibility 
from one person to another.  The handoff has been defined as “the transfer of 
professional responsibility and accountability for some or all aspects of care for a 
patient, or group of patients, to another person, or professional group on a temporary or 
permanent basis (Salzwedel et al, 2013). During patient care, handoffs occur when one 
person providing patient care transfers their responsibility to another provider who is 
assuming that role.  The primary objective of a patient handoff is the accurate transfer of 
vital information and the anticipated plan of care.   
Patient handoffs occur frequently among anesthesia providers during the patient’s 
perioperative experience.  Handoffs occur for meal breaks, bathroom breaks, at the 
change of shifts or when a patient is transferred to the post anesthesia care unit (PACU) 
or intensive care unit (ICU) for recovery.  The more frequently handoffs occur, the 
greater the risk of miscommunication and subsequent patient care errors (Solet et al, 
2005).   
Patient handoffs are recognized as a vulnerable point for communication failure in 
the process of patient care (Dracup & Morris, 2008; Nagpul et al, 2010; Kalkman, 2010, 
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Kitch et al, 2008).  This vulnerability is due to the potential for relevant patient 
information to be omitted or incorrectly reported, undermining subsequent patient care.  
Clancy (2008) stated that the failures associated with handoffs might be among the 
most important contributors to preventable adverse events in healthcare.  Handoff 
failures are common and can lead to diagnostic and therapeutic delays and precipitate 
adverse events (Segall et al, 2012).  The precise quantification of the number and type 
of errors that occur during the anesthesia handoff process is not known.  The 
assumption is made, that due to the high volume of handoffs in anesthesia and the 
vulnerability of the handoff process that potentially many instances of error occur. 
Background 
Data from the late 1990’s led the Institute of Medicine to estimate that at least 
44,000 and as many as 98,000 patients die in hospitals in the U.S. each year from 
medical errors (Kohn et al 2000).  At the time, this study’s results were alarming and 
provided for the “modern patient safety movement.”  A decade later, it was reported that 
much progress had been made in building a foundation to address patient safety 
(Clancy, 2009).  However, a more recent study reveals that the rate of preventable harm 
may be up to ten times higher than the IOM estimates (Classen et al, 2011).  James 
(2013) provided an updated estimate and states that 400,000 unnecessary deaths, due 
to medical errors, occur in hospitals alone.  This study also reports that serious harm is 
10 to 20 times more prevalent than patient death, indicating between 4 million and 8 
million people seriously harmed from medical errors in hospitals.  
Medical errors continue to cause disability and death to patients every day in our 
health care system. The IOM publication, To Err is Human, was a landmark report 
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calling patient safety to the forefront (Classen et al, 2011).  Despite patient safety 
initiatives and increased awareness from patient safety organizations since the IOM 
report, medical errors continue to be a major concern.  The Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement estimates that nearly 15 million instances of medical harm occur in the 
United States each year that equals a rate of over 40,000 instances of medical harm 
each day in the US (McCannon et al, 2007). 
The responsibility of health care providers is to first, do no harm.  Patients expect 
to receive safe care delivered by safe practitioners, however they are sometimes let 
down.   
“We in medicine have discovered how discouragingly often we turn out to do 
wrong by patients.  For one thing, where the knowledge of what the right 
thing to do exists, we still too frequently fail to do it.  Plain old mistakes of 
execution are not uncommon, and we have only begun to recognize the 
systemic frailties, technological faults, and human inadequacies that cause 
them, let alone how to reduce them” (Gawande, 2002).   
 
Medical errors are costly in terms of patient deaths as well as disability, health care 
costs, and lost income.  The total national cost of adverse events was estimated to be 
37.6 billion dollars with 17 billion attributable to preventable adverse events.  The total 
costs of adverse events were nearly four percent of national health care expenditures 
for 1996 (Kohn et al, 2000).  These figures are modest though as only hospital patients 
are represented.  Andel et al (2012) report that costs of medical errors could approach 
one trillion dollars per year if current estimates of medical harm are accurate. The IOM 
states “It is impossible for the nation to achieve the greatest value possible from the 
billions of dollars spent on medical care if the care contains errors” (Kohn et al 2000).   
Indirect costs of medical errors include lost productivity, disability costs and the 
personal expenses of care.  In addition, patients, and their family and friends, lose trust 
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in the health care system as they are left to deal with physical and emotional scars. 
Health care providers are also affected by medical errors. Practitioners may experience 
guilt, shame, and self doubt when a patient suffers disability or death due to a medical 
error made by the health care provider or the health care team (Elder & Dovey, 2002). 
Patient Safety  
Patient safety is the “freedom from accidental injury” (Kohn et al, 2000).  Patient 
safety has long been a concern in healthcare.  One of the earliest references to patient 
safety was from the Greek physician Hippocrates in the 4th century B.C.  The 
Hippocratic Oath states “primum non nocere” or “the first thing is do no harm.”   
The modern patient safety movement is attributed to the IOM report, To Err Is 
Human.  It was a government-supported report, which sought to identify the scope of 
the patient safety problem.  Since the IOM report, To Err is Human, healthcare has seen 
modest improvements.  Wachter (2010), a noted patient safety expert, graded 
healthcare giving it a B-.  He states that healthcare is not safe enough from the patient 
perspective but that research is providing opportunities for improvements in patient 
safety. 
Anesthesia Patient Safety 
The very first provider-led patient safety organization, the Anesthesia Patient 
Safety Foundation (APSF), was created by the anesthesia profession in 1985 
(Eichhorn, 2012).  Their vision is “that no patient shall be harmed by anesthesia.” The 
APSF is credited with a reduction in catastrophic accidents and a reduced number and 
severity of liability claims (Eichhorn, 2012).  The anesthesia profession is identified as a 
model in health care for prioritizing patient safety.  The APSF was cited by the IOM 
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report “To Err is Human” for making a demonstrable positive impact on patient safety 
(Kohn et al, 2000). 
Despite these advances in anesthesia patient safety, the operating room is still 
considered to be a high-risk environment.  The operating room is noted for its 
complexity and chaotic environment (Schimpff, 2007).  Control of this environment can 
be challenging as there are many disciplines coming together to form the operating 
room team.  The operating room team consists of an anesthesia provider(s), 
surgeon(s), circulating nurse and scrub nurse. Each of these team members is well 
trained in their separate disciplines and is well trained to perform specific duties, yet 
they often do not work in a true team fashion (Schimpff, 2007).  In a complex 
environment, teams must rely heavily on interdependence and team coordination, yet 
these skills are lacking in the OR (Entin et al, 2006). Improved communication is 
essential to reducing errors (Schimpff, 2007). 
The Joint Commission states that safety and quality of patient care depends on 
teamwork, communication and a collaborative work environment.  If these are impaired 
then the ability of the health care team to function well is at risk (Joint Commission, 
2004).  Yet the OR is labeled as a unique cultural environment with system factors 
marked by production pressure, cost-containment and hierarchies (Schimpff, 2007).     
Patient Handoffs 
Providing care to patients has become increasingly complex (Hunt et al, 2007).  No 
one person can be expected to provide care for a patient on his or her own.  Patient 
care generally involves multiple providers (physicians, nurses, therapists) and different 
specialties (emergency medicine, internal medicine, surgery).  Additionally, care 
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providers are not present around the clock (Solet et al, 2005).  Therefore patients see 
multiple providers throughout a 24-hour period due to shift changes and breaks.  The 
“patient handoff” is a term used to describe the transfer of role and responsibility from 
one person to another in a physical or mental process (Solet et al, 2005).  When a 
patient handoff occurs, the primary objective is the accurate transfer of information 
about the patient and the care plan (Patterson et al, 2004). 
 During the handoff, valuable information can be omitted or misinterpreted leaving 
the patient at risk for errors.  Patient handoffs may occur many times during a patient’s 
care.  Patient handoffs occur frequently in the perioperative setting.  Nurse Anesthetists 
may perform patient handoffs for bathroom breaks, meal breaks and shift changes.  
Handoffs also occur when patients are received in the operating room from the intensive 
care unit (ICU) and postoperatively when patient care is transferred to the ICU or post-
anesthesia recovery unit.  Due to the number of patient handoffs that occur in the 
operative setting, there is considerable risk to the patient from communication failure.   
The Joint Commission recognized the inherent risks of patient handoffs and in 
2007 created national safety goal 2E (Figure 1).  This goal states that a standardized 
approach to handoff communication must be implemented (Joint Commission, 2007).  
This standardized approach to handoffs include interactive communications, accurate 
information, limited interruptions, a verification process and the opportunity for questions 
and review. 
Communication Failures 
Communication failures are the leading cause of inadvertent patient harm (Leonard 
et al, 2004).  Various reasons for communication breakdown have been identified.  The 
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increased utilization of hospitalists have shifted the focus from a primary care physician 
who used to see his or her patients in the hospital, to multiple physician specialists who 
share in the care of a patient.  Also, the reduction in resident physician hours has 
increased the number of times a patient’s care is transferred (Solet et al, 2005).  The 
discontinuity of care is unavoidable, as the same person does not provide patient care 
24 hours a day.  In fact, patient care has the potential to be transferred several times in 
a 24-hour period (Solet et al, 2005).   
 
Figure 1.  Joint Commission National Patient Safety Goal 2E 
 
Despite the high potential for communication breakdown, little to no attention is 
given to communication or patient handoffs during medical or nursing education.  
Instead, handoffs are taught by apprenticeship as students watch their preceptors give 
and receive handoffs.  The result is caregivers who learn to give hurried reports in noisy 
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settings (Dracup & Morris, 2008).  At this time little evidence exists to demonstrate that 
this Joint Commission goal is being met as most anesthesia handoffs lack a 
standardized approach.   
Problem Statement 
Medical errors are a serious threat to patients.  The most common root cause of 
medical errors is communication failure.  Research has demonstrated that 
communications failures occur frequently during the handoff process.  Handoffs are 
common in anesthesia.  No research has been conducted that correlates system 
failures (latent conditions) with human failures (low quality handoffs) during the 
anesthesia patient handoff process. 
During the patient handoff, valuable information can be omitted or misinterpreted 
leaving the patient at risk for errors due to communication failures.  Due to the large 
volume of patient handoffs by anesthetists, research is needed to determine the scope 
of problem. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to: 
1- Identify latent conditions that are present during the handoff. 
2- Identify handoff failures during anesthesia patient handoffs performed in a 
simulated OR environment. 
3- Correlate the latent conditions to handoff failures during the simulated 
anesthesia patient handoff. 
Research Question 
	  	   11	  
1-What are the frequencies of latent conditions that occur during the anesthesia 
patient handoff? 
2- Is there an association between latent conditions and handoff scores? 
Hypothesis 
1- There is no difference in handoff scores related to latency scores. (null) 
2- Handoff scores are inversely related to latency scores.  (alternative) 
 Errors during the handoff process frequently result from communication failure and 
can result in death or disability (Kitch et al, 2008).  This research will identify the latent 
conditions that are present and their effect on handoff quality during anesthesia patient 
handoffs. A pilot study will be conducted to evaluate the use the VCU anesthesia 
handoff coding tool and to determine the interrater reliability.   
Conceptual Framework 
Error is defined as the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or 
the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (Kohn et al, 2000).  Freud believed error was 
the result of an unconscious drive. He assumed those who committed error were 
deficient and error prone (Strauch, 2002).   Assigning blame or considering one error 
prone is considered the old view or “the bad apple theory” (Dekker, 2006).   This view 
sees humans as the cause of trouble.   
The new view sees human error as a symptom of deeper trouble; not that humans 
are the cause for failure, but that systems are inherently not safe. Dekker states that 
systems exist to make money, render service, and provide products but not necessarily 
to be safe (Dekker, 2006).  An example of the new view of error follows.  A patient 
receives morphine after surgery despite having an allergy to it.  It is hard to imagine how 
	  	   12	  
that happens.  Is the surgeon at fault?  How about the anesthetist or recovery nurse?  
According to the new view of error, the system is at fault.  Improvements in the system 
to prevent this type of error include better communication through patient handoffs and 
team briefings before and after surgery.  The new view of human errors sees the 
complexity in which people work and views errors as structurally related, not personal. 
(Dekker, 2006) 
An interesting error concept is Reason’s (1990) description of two kinds of errors, 
active errors and latent errors.  Active errors have effects that are felt almost 
instantaneously and are associated with front-line operators such as pilots, air traffic 
controllers and officers.  Latent errors lie dormant within a system for a length of time 
and their consequences become evident only when other factors combine to cause a 
breakdown in the system.  Latent errors are present within a system long before an 
error is committed.  Latent errors are errors in waiting and growing evidence shows that 
discovering and neutralizing these errors will have a much greater effect on system 
safety than efforts to minimize active errors (Reason, 1990).  “Thus systems that rely on 
human perfection present what Reason calls “latent errors”-errors waiting to 
happen…You can also make the case that onerous workloads, chaotic environments, 
and inadequate team communication all represent latent errors in the system” 
(Gawande 2002, p. 63). 
Latent errors may be the result of production pressure, distractions and the OR 
environment.  This research is designed to examine patient handoffs in anesthesia.  
Handoffs are made more difficult by the latent conditions of time constraints, pressure 
and distractions, which often result in incomplete or inaccurate handoff reports.  This 
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study will identify the latent conditions that occur during the handoff process and how 
the latent conditions affect the quality of the handoff.   
Justification 
 Patient handoffs may occur many times during an anesthetists shift.  CRNAs 
perform patient handoffs for bathroom breaks, meal breaks and shift changes.  
Handoffs also occur when patients are received in the operating room from the intensive 
care unit (ICU) and postoperatively when patient care is transferred to the ICU or post-
anesthesia recovery unit.  The more frequently handoffs occur, the greater the risk of 
miscommunication and patient care errors (Solet et al, 2005).  Due to the number of 
patient handoffs that occur in the operative setting, there is considerable risk to the 
patient from communication failure.  There are no studies however, of the handoff 
process among certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs).  This is a timely and 
important research topic that will seek to improve the anesthesia patient handoff 
process by identifying latent conditions and classifying errors that occur during the 
handoff.   
Significance 
Communication failure is the leading cause of patient harm due to errors 
(Leonard et al, 2004).  The Joint Commission reviewed 2455 sentinel events and 
found that 70% resulted from communication failure.   Sentinel events are unexpected 
occurrences involving death or serious physical injury or the risk of death or serious 
injury.  In 2006, communication failure was a cause in 65% of 516 sentinel events 
(Joint Commission, 2006).  The Joint Commission, recognizing the inherent risks of 
patient handoffs, created national safety goal 2E.  This safety goal states that a 
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standardized approach to handoff communication must be implemented (Joint 
Commission, 2007).  Recommendations from the Joint Commission for standardizing 
handoffs include: 
• Interactive communications allowing opportunity for questions 
• A process for verification including repeat-back or read-back 
• An opportunity for the receiver to review the patient’s history 
• Interruptions are limited 
There are few examples in the literature of standardized handoffs being performed by 
anesthetists.   
Handoff strategies from other industries including a NASA space center, a 
nuclear power plant, a railroad dispatch center and an ambulance dispatch center 
demonstrated how handoffs could be modified to improve safety.  Handoffs from these 
organizations use strategies including face-to-face updates with interactive 
questioning, limited interruptions during the update, and the use of handwritten 
annotations such as a checklist (Patterson et al, 2004).  This study will evaluate the 
number of errors and the type of errors that occur during the anesthesia handoff 
process.  The goal is to better understand the reasons for failure during the anesthesia 
handoff.  
The setting for this research will be The Center for Research in Human 
Simulation (CRHS) at the Virginia Commonwealth University Nurse Anesthesia 
Program (Figure 2).  The Center was established in 1998 and supports research in the 
areas of human simulation, education, human error and patient safety. The CRHS is 
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located on the 2nd floor of West Hospital on the MCV campus of Virginia 
Commonwealth University.  
 
Figure 2.  The Center for Research in Human Simulation 
 
The facility occupies over 1500 square feet of space in the Department of Nurse 
Anesthesia within the School of Allied Health Professions.  State-of-the-art audiovisual 
equipment enables instructors to record training activities and provide detailed and 
subsequent debriefings for simulation participants.  
Simulation is utilized by many industries to promote team communication, 
procedural skill training, and educational evaluations (Hunt et al, 2007).  Medical 
simulation provides an immersive and interactive clinical experience for the learner.  
Simulation offers realistic, experiential learning without risk to the patient.  Simulation is 
now considered a key technique for decreasing error, increasing patient safety and 
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identifying and correcting the human factors that affect clinical outcome (Brindley & 
Dunn, 2009).   
The simulation setting provides for the evaluation of patient handoffs without risk 
to the patient.  This environment allows the anesthetist to make mistakes which can be 
identified and corrected during the debrief period.  The experience of simulation also 
allows the researchers to observe patient handoffs without risk to patient safety yet the 
realism of high-fidelity simulation allows the study results to be generalized to the target 
population.   
For this study, a convenience sample of 60 anesthesia crisis resource 
management scenarios will be selected from the CRHS video library. Videos from 2006 
to the present are available for study. The participants in the simulation scenarios 
included anesthesiologists, certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) and student 
registered nurse anesthetists (SRNAs).  Simulation videos will be evaluated and coded 
by five researchers from the study team.    
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Chapter Two:  Literature Review 
 
This chapter will provide an overview of patient safety including history and the 
emergence of the modern patient safety movement.  Patient safety is defined as “the 
freedom from injury” (Kohn et al, 2000).  Another, more detailed, definition of patient 
safety is “a discipline in the health care sector that applies safety science methods 
toward the goal of achieving a trustworthy system of health care delivery.  Patient safety 
is also an attribute of health care systems; it minimizes the incidence and impact of, and 
maximizes recovery from, adverse events” (Emanuel et al, 2008). 
The potential for medical care to cause harm, has been appreciated throughout 
the history of caregiving.  One of the earliest references to patient safety was the 
Hippocratic Oath, credited to Hippocrates in the 4th century B.C (Heard, 2001).  The 
Hippocratic Oath states, “primim non nocere” implying that the first thing is, “do no 
harm.”  This ethical principle has been repeated consistently as it remains as part of 
several medical oaths.  Florence Nightingale (1860) acknowledged the principle of “do 
no harm” when stating, “It may seem a strange principle to enunciate as the very first 
requirement in a hospital that it should do the sick no harm.” 
It was not until the landmark publication by Beecher and Todd that anesthesia 
patient safety received much deserved, systematic attention.  Beecher and Todd (1954) 
reported that anesthesia mortality was high with a mortality rate of one death for every 
1,580 anesthetics.  They stated that death from anesthesia was of sufficient magnitude 
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to constitute a public health problem; noting that anesthesia, at that time, was killing 
more people each year than the prominent disease polio.  The authors anticipated that 
their research would stimulate renewed interest of other groups in patient mortality. 
Their reporting of mortality statistics ignited research identifying the harm that 
was occurring for some patients. “The Hazards of Modern Diagnosis and Therapy – The 
Price We Pay” by Barr (1955) was one of the original publications to identify that 
patients are harmed by diagnostic and therapeutic procedures.  It was reported that 
incalculable benefits have come to mankind with newer procedures but the cost was 
hazards that have subsequently increased enormously.   Barr wrote, “these accidents, 
risks and dangers may be regarded as the price we, as responsible physicians, must 
pay for the inestimable benefits of modern diagnosis and therapy.  They are the hazards 
to which, with best intent and most correct practice, me must occasionally subject our 
patients.”  Barr was the first to quantify the risk, reporting that 5% of patients admitted to 
the medical ward were victims of “unfortunate sequelae and accidents.”  He concluded 
that iatrogenic disease could be one of the commonest conditions encountered during 
hospitalization.  Although his work focused on physician providers, this message 
resonated through the healthcare community of providers. 
Schimmel (1964) published “The Hazards of Hospitalization” reporting that 20% 
of patients admitted to their medical ward experienced one or more untoward events.  
Of those patients that experienced untoward episodes, 10% had a prolonged or 
unresolved episode and 5% were considered serious or fatal.  Schimmel noted that the 
economic and emotional impact suffered by many patients could not be considered 
insignificant complications of their medical care.  This is considered a landmark paper in 
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the measurement of quality of care, credited with acknowledging that patients were 
often harmed in hospitals (Burke, 2003).  Schimmel suggested that the risk of having an 
untoward episode was directly related to the length of time spent in the hospital.  
Anesthesia, as a medical and nursing specialty, continued to struggle with 
unacceptably high rates of morbidity and mortality.  Cooper (1978) acknowledged 
anesthesia safety issues and addressed them with a novel approach.  He believed that 
in order to decrease the frequency of error, a clearer understanding of the 
circumstances that surrounded that error was needed.  Cooper, an engineer, brought 
safety science to health care.  Using a methodology known as critical-incident analysis, 
useful in the aviation industry, he applied it to the study preventable anesthetic mishaps.  
This technique allowed for discovery of the etiology of anesthetic errors and provided for 
the application of human-factors principles, which was again successful in the field of 
aviation (Cooper, 1978). 
 In 1981, Steele et al, studied iatrogenic illness or “the disease that would not 
have occurred if medical therapy had not been employed.”  They found that at least a 
third of all patients had some ill effect during hospitalization that was not related to any 
pathologic process.  Their results showed that 9% of patients had a major untoward 
event during their hospitalization.  Clearly the risks incurred during hospitalization are 
not trivial.  Steele concluded, regardless of how ill patients might be and regardless of 
what benefits hospitalization provide; mechanisms must be developed to assess the 
hazards of hospitalization. 
1995 was a pivotal year for patient safety (Leape, 2008).  A series of medical 
errors put hospitals in the headlines.  Two massive overdoses of chemotherapy 
	  	   20	  
medications occurred at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute within two days of each other.  
One patient, Betsy Lehman, age 39, was killed by a four-fold overdose and another 
patient sustained permanent heart damage (Altman, 1995).  Betsy Lehman was an 
award-winning health columnist for the Boston Globe.  The Boston Globe published the 
news of the medical mistakes and it made National headlines.  The Globe reported, “it 
was a blunder compounded or overlooked by at least a dozen physicians, nurses and 
pharmacists, including some of the institution’s senior staff.”  
The “modern patient safety movement” began with the publication of the Harvard 
Medical Practice Study in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1991 (Leape, 2008).  
The Harvard Medical Practice Study retrospectively examined 30,121 patients who 
were hospitalized in acute care hospitals in New York State during 1984.  The study 
revealed that 3.7% of hospitalized patients suffered an adverse event (Brennan et al, 
1991).  An adverse event was considered as all injury caused by medical treatment, 
which either resulted in a longer hospital stay or caused disability or death.  Most of the 
adverse events (69%) were considered to be preventable.  The largest number of 
adverse events, 41%, resulted from treatment provided in the operating room (Leape, 
1991).  The study was published in the New England Journal of Medicine and the 
findings were a front-page article in the New York Times but little attention was paid to 
these landmark findings (Leape, 2008). 
Despite the described incidents and publications, patient safety still was not a 
major concern for most hospitals or the public.  That changed in November of 1999, 
when the Institutes of Medicine (IOM) released its report on patient safety, “To Err is 
Human.”  The IOM report used the data from the Harvard Medical Practice Study and a 
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later study conducted in Colorado and Utah to conclude that medical errors caused 
44,000 to 98,000 preventable deaths each year in US hospitals (Kohn et al, 2000).  In 
addition to lives lost, preventable medical errors were estimated to cost between 17 
billion and 29 billion dollars per year in direct health care costs, lost income, lost 
household productivity and disability (Kohn et al, 2000).  This report garnered 
substantial media attention and caught the eye of the public.  Overnight, attention to the 
seriousness of the medical error problem spread from hundreds to millions (Leape, 
2008).  President Clinton appointed a government task force to review the IOM report 
and make recommendations for action.  Within days of the IOM report, President 
Clinton signed into law the Healthcare Research and Quality Act of 1999.  In 2005, 
Congress enacted the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. 
The IOM report produced three important effects.  First, it gained the attention of 
hospitals, health-care workers, administrators, regulators and payors, so the patient 
safety problem could no longer be ignored.  Second, it led to the creation of the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and provided funding that attracted 
hundreds of new investigators into patient safety research.  And finally, To Err is Human 
motivated health care facilities to make changes needed to improve patient safety 
(Leape, 2008). 
Since the IOM report, many patient safety initiatives were started.  Many 
specialty societies have incorporated safety topics into meetings, education and 
research (Leape, 2008).  The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services partnered with more than 20 surgical organizations 
producing a program to reduce surgical complications.  The National Quality Forum 
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(NQF) created standards for mandatory reporting of adverse events and created a list of 
30 evidence-based safe practices for implementation by hospitals.  The Joint 
Commission (JC) has led many initiatives to improve patient safety.  The JC requires 
hospitals to implement new safe practices.  Starting in 2003, the JC implemented 
National Patient Safety Goals (NPSGs).  For 2014, the JC has 16 NPSGs that are 
based on emerging patient safety issues as identified by key stakeholders including 
practitioners and provider organizations.  The NPSGs were established to help 
accredited organizations address specific areas of concern in regard to patient safety 
(Joint Commission, 2014). 
The National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) is another nongovernmental 
organization with a patient safety mission.  The NPSF was created and funded by the 
American Medical Association with support from several medical industry businesses.  
The NPSF is now an independent organization that partners with patients and families, 
the health care community, and key stakeholders to advance patient safety and health 
care workforce safety and disseminate strategies to prevent harm (NPSF, 2014).  The 
NPSF is a leader in patient safety advocacy, patient safety research and provides 
regional and national conferences to instruct patient safety leaders. 
The Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) is a powerful force for patient 
safety (Leape, 2008).  The IHI focuses on medication safety, intensive care, cardiac 
care and other areas.  They have developed many system changes and measures 
including the IHI “global trigger tool” for measuring adverse events.  The IHI conducted 
the “100,000 lives” campaign, where over 3000 hospitals participated in implementing 
one or more of six proven practices with the goal of preventing over 100,000 deaths 
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related to adverse events (Berwick et al, 2006).  The campaign ended in 2006 and 
observed a reduction in mortality of 122,300 patients. 
An organization with a long history of improving patient safety is the Anesthesia 
Patient Safety Foundation (APSF).  The APSF was formed in 1985 and was the first 
independent, multi-disciplinary organization created expressly to help avoid preventable 
adverse clinical outcomes, especially those related to human error (APSF, 2014).  The 
APSF states that it is the first organization to recognize the patient safety problem, 
which was driven by the earliest research into human error in medicine.  The APSF’s 
mission is to improve continually the safety of patients during anesthesia care by 
encouraging and conducting: safety research and education, patient safety programs 
and campaigns, and National and International exchange of information and ideas.   
Despite the efforts of safety organizations to increase awareness, provide 
training, and fund research, patient safety still remains a serious problem for the 
healthcare industry.  The AHRQ released a report that noted that patient safety was 
actually getting worse instead of better.  The director of the AHRQ, Carolyn Clancy 
(2009), wrote, “considerable work remains to ensure that patients are safe…all would 
agree that far more work needs to be done.”  Noted patient safety expert, Wachter 
(2010) reported that on the ten-year anniversary of the IOM report, our safety efforts 
earned a grade of  “B minus” writing that although we have made progress, incremental 
progress is probably the best we can hope for.  Leape, at al (2009) wrote, “Healthcare is 
unsafe….progress has fallen far short.  Many patients continue to fear, justifiably, that 
they may be harmed when they enter a hospital.” 
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Recently, an estimate of patient harm by James (2013) reports a minimum lower 
limit of 210,000 deaths per year from preventable harm in US hospitals.  James used 
the IHI’s Global Trigger Tool to flag medical records.  He stated that given the 
incompleteness of the medical records that the trigger tool depends on, deaths from 
preventable harm was estimated to be more than 400,000 per year.  Noted patient 
safety experts Lucian Leape, David Classen and Marty Makary reported that the 
estimate from James is accurate and that it is time to stop citing the 98,000 number 
(Allen, 2013). 
One of the key findings of the IOM report was that most of the preventable 
medical errors were not caused by careless providers but were the result of defective 
systems (Levy, et al, 2010).  This started a new way of thinking about errors that shifted 
the focus from the provider to remedying systemic defects.  The IOM report (2000) 
indicated that patient safety might benefit from systems-level error analysis that has 
been successful in aviation.  Voluntary error reporting was suggested to allow for the 
review of errors and to provide for system corrections.  The systems-based approach 
shifted the focus to prospective systemic safety remedies and prophylaxis, rather than 
on assessment of blame (Levy et al, 2010).   
In order to make patient safety improvements, it is critical to understand how 
systems work, what factors allow them work well and why adverse events occur.  In 
complex, high-risk systems (nuclear power, aviation, healthcare) it is obviously not wise 
to wait for a serious accident in order to evaluate the system’s safety attributes.  
Aviation and nuclear power have employed human factors techniques to learn about 
system performance and safety risks (Weinger et al, 2002).   
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Error and Error Theory 
Error is defined as the failure of a planned action to be completed as 
intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (Kohn et al, 2000).  Freud 
believed error was the result of an unconscious drive. He assumed those who 
committed error were deficient and error prone (Strauch, 2002).   Assigning blame or 
considering one error prone is considered the old view or “the bad apple theory” 
(Dekker, 2006).   This view sees humans as the cause of trouble.  With this view, the 
system is considered safe but a few “bad apples” do not follow the rules.  Using the bad 
apple theory, errors can be reduced by adding or enforcing procedures, adding more 
technology or simply by removing the bad apples.  A major flaw of this view is its 
assumption that people can choose between making errors and not making them.   
For a long time, patient safety analysis has been person-centered rather than 
system-centered.  With the person-centered approach, the focus is on the “human 
factor” and is concentrated on the individual responsible for the error.  Human error 
implies a deficit in an individual’s knowledge or technical skill or carelessness (van 
Beuzekom et al, 2010). Solutions for this type of human error typically include retraining, 
extra supervision or even disciplinary action.   
An alternative to this punitive approach is the systems approach.  The systems 
approach pays attention to organizational factors that are precursors to those individual 
errors.  The systems approach assumes that humans are fallible and that systems need 
to be designed to prevent and absorb human error (van Beuzekom et al, 2010).  This 
more enlightened view sees human error as a symptom of deeper trouble; not that 
humans are the cause for failure, but that certain systems are inherently unsafe.  
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Dekker (2006) explains that systems are set up to make money, render service, and 
provide products but not necessarily to be safe.   This view of human errors sees the 
complexity in which people work and views errors as structurally related, not personal.  
Human performance is a complex interaction of factors including the relationship 
between individuals and their general working environment (see Figure 3).  When the 
environment allows for errors by individuals, the environment can be searched for 
underlying conditions that have been recognized or tolerated.  The embedded factors 
making errors more likely are called latent risk factors (van Beuzekom et al, 2010). 
 
Figure 3.  Human Factors Considerations 
 
Reason (1990) described the “Swiss cheese model” that was originally 
developed for accident investigations in industry such as oil and gas, aviation, railways 
and nuclear power generation (van Beuzekom et al, 2010).  This model is useful for 
explaining why rare accidents occur in high-risk activities.  Systems have developed 
defensive layers (alarms, physical barriers, automatic shutdowns) and rely on skilled 
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individuals (anesthetists, pilots, control room operators) to prevent errors or alert to 
errors before harm occurs.  With this model, serious adverse events are usually 
preceded by a chain of individually unimportant errors, influenced by a variety of factors.   
The Swiss cheese model identifies two kinds of errors, active errors and latent 
errors (Figure 4).  Active errors have effects that are felt almost instantaneously and are 
associated with front-line operators such as pilots, air traffic controllers and military 
officers.  Latent errors lie dormant within a system for a length of time and their 
consequences become evident only when other factors combine to cause a breakdown 
in the system.  Latent errors are present within a system long before an error is 
committed.  Evidence shows that discovering and neutralizing latent conditions will have 
a much greater effect on system safety than efforts to minimize active errors (Reason, 
1990). 
 
Figure 4.  Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model 
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Reason’s Swiss cheese model directs attention to system issues during error 
investigations.  The model proposes that latent conditions allow an error to proceed 
through the system defense (holes of the cheese) and cause harm.  Reason believed 
that situations rather than individuals are error prone.  His system approach shifts the 
blame from the individual towards an acceptance of the inevitability of error.  This 
approach moves from disciplinary actions towards learning from accidents.   
Latent factors including communication, teamwork difficulties and lack of training 
are commonly documented in many investigations.  Systems-based latent conditions 
are usually persistent but not obvious.  Gawande (2002) stated “systems that rely on 
human perfection present what Reason calls ‘latent errors’-errors waiting to happen…a 
case can also be made that onerous workloads, chaotic environments, and inadequate 
team communication all represent latent errors in the system.” 
Communication Failure 
Communication is foundational to safe, high quality patient care (Clancy, 2008).  
Communication failures are a leading cause of adverse events and inadvertent patient 
harm (Leonard et al, 2004; Hu et al, 2012; Lingard et al, 2004)).   Clancy (2008) stated 
that communication failures are one of the most important contributors to preventable 
adverse events in health care.  Wilson et al (1995) conducted a large study of 28 
hospitals and found that communication errors were the leading cause of adverse 
events.  Their results showed that communication errors caused twice as many deaths 
as incompetence.  Lingard et al, (2004) studied communication events in the operating 
room and found a failure rate of 30.6% during room setup and induction of anesthesia.  
A similar study by Hu et al, (2012) found a nearly 10% communication failure rate during 
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complex operations.  According to the JC, communication failure is a root cause (or 
fundamental reason for failure) in 63% of reviewed sentinel events (Joint Commission, 
2013)  
A variety of factors are known to undermine communication quality.  A lack of 
information or misinformation can result in patient care errors.  Lingard et al (2004) 
classified communication failures into 4 types: audience (missing key individuals), 
purpose (issue nonresolution), content (insufficient/inaccurate information) and/or 
occasion (timing issue).  Communication can also suffer from too much information or 
“cognitive overload.”  The operating room is a data-rich, technological environment with 
so much information that the burden is sifting through the less-critical, irrelevant 
information in a timely manner (Steinberger et al, 2009).   
Structural barriers such as educational silos, authority gradients, role 
specialization and incentives that favor individual rather than team performances also 
lead to ineffective communication (Clancy, 2008).  Leonard et al (2004) suggest that the 
communication styles of nurses and physician are different and contribute to 
miscommunication.  Nurses tend to provide broad, narrative descriptions and physicians 
prefer factual highlights that pertain to the situation at hand. 
There are two additional factors that have been identified that allow or promote 
communication failures.  They are “migration of practice” and “normalization of 
deviance.”  Amalberti (2006) described the migration of practice from a safety zone into 
a zone of potential danger.  This migration of practice towards danger occurs when 
communication failures do not produce immediate effects, lulling one into a false sense 
of security.   
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The normalization of deviance (Prielipp et al, 2010) is an incremental process 
and a gradual erosion of standard procedures that would never be tolerated in a single 
movement.  Instead the small, gradual movement is tolerated.  Without incident, these 
deviant changes become “normalized.”  Normalization of deviance tolerates more risk 
and more errors, always in the interest of efficiency (Prielipp et al, 2010).  This type of 
thinking places productivity and efficiency above vigilance and safety. 
Communication failures may cause errors in patient care and other negative 
consequences such as delay, inefficiency and tension among team members (Lingard 
et al, 2004).  Communication failures that occur during patient transfers or handoffs are 
also concerning.  Whether or not handovers worsen patient outcomes remains unclear 
(Saager et al, 2014). The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of latent 
conditions on the communication that occurs during the patient handoff process. 
Patient Handoffs 
The handoff process is the transfer of patient care and responsibility among 
caregivers (Solet et al, 2005; Hunt et al, 2007; Catchpole et al, 2010; Saager et al, 
2014).  Handoffs are inevitable, as care is transferred among providers during breaks 
and shift changes.  Patient care generally involved multiple providers and different 
specialties.  Additionally, care providers are not present for 24 hour shifts so care has to 
be transferred.  The amount of patient handoffs has increased as a result of the resident 
duty-hour restrictions (Lane-Fall et al, 2014).  When transferring care to another 
provider, clinicians have a duty to ensure that an effective handoff occurs (Jorm et al, 
2009). 
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Although little precedence for standardized handoffs exists in healthcare, 
examples of organizations with a high consequence for failure using standardized 
handoffs are well known.  Handoff strategies from a National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) space center, a nuclear power plant, a railroad dispatch center 
and an ambulance dispatch center were observed to determine how handoffs could be 
modified to improve patient safety.  Handoffs from these organizations used strategies 
including face-to-face updates with interactive questioning, limited interruptions during 
the update, topics initiated by incoming as well as outgoing, and incoming receives 
paperwork that includes handwritten annotations (Patterson et al, 2004). 
Handoff communication is a high priority for regulatory and educational purposes 
(Lane-Fall et al, 2014).  The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education 
(ACGME) recognized the importance of handoffs and requires all ACGME-accredited 
programs confirm competence in handoff communications for their residents (Lane-Fall 
et al, 2014).  The Joint Commission has recognized the potential for communication 
failure during patient handoffs.  In 2006, the Joint Commission (JC) made handoffs a 
focus of the National Patient Safety Goals (NPSG).  The JC NPSG (Figure 5) requires a 
standardized approach to hand-off communications.  The Joint Commission also 
expects hand-offs to include interactive communications, accurate information, limited 
interruptions, a verification process and the opportunity for questions and review 
(Dracup & Morris, 2008). 
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Figure 5.  Joint Commission National Patient Safety Goal 2 
 
Prior to the JC requirement, little attention was given to handoff communications.  
The majority of research to date evaluates resident handoffs, especially in the 
specialties of emergency medicine and intensive care.  Kitch et al (2008) surveyed 
residents in a large academic medical center to determine the quality and effects of 
handoffs during their most recent rotation.  The results of the study showed that 59% of 
residents reported harm, to one or more patients, during their most recent rotation due 
to a poor patient handoff.  Many residents reported handoffs were conducted in noisy 
environments with multiple interruptions.  The authors concluded that harm to patients 
from problematic handoffs is common. 
A study examining the change of shift report in medical and surgical units 
showed a lack of content structure, high noise levels, interruptions and no use of the 
electronic health record during the change of shift report.  The authors concluded that 
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improvements were needed for the change of shift report including a consistent 
structure and reduced interruptions and noise (Staggers & Jennings, 2009).   There is 
also complacency with the handoff process and little recognition of the high-risk nature 
of handoffs (Jorm et al, 2009).   Problems that can occur due to a poor handoff include 
the administration of an incorrect medication, the failure to administer a medication, 
treatment delays and preventable readmissions.  Poor handoffs waste time, strain 
limited healthcare resources and causes harm to patients (Jorm et al, 2009).  
Healthcare professionals need to know that handoffs add risk to patient care and that a 
clearly communicated handoff is integral to the delivery of safe patient care. 
Berkenstadt, et al (2008) conducted a study of patient handoffs using high fidelity 
medical simulation.  The researchers conducted a study that observed critical care 
nurses during a handoff scenario in a simulation environment.  The authors noted that 
medical simulation provides a unique opportunity for training in team and interpersonal 
communication skills that is rarely addressed in traditional medical education.  Clancy 
(2008) states that simulation allows researchers to analyze common practices, such as 
handoffs, in order to discover opportunities for improvement that may not be easily 
detectable during patient care. 
Patient handoffs are recognized as a vulnerable point in the process of patient 
care (Dracup & Morris, 2008).  During the handoff, valuable information can be omitted 
or misinterpreted leaving the patient at risk for errors.  The handoff is a period of great 
risk to the patient because handoffs occur in a chaotic environment.  During the handoff, 
there is typically a lot happening at one time and opportunities for critical information to 
be lost or misinterpreted (Clancy, 2008). 
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Patient handoffs may occur many times during a patient’s care.  The more 
frequently handoffs occur, the greater the risk of miscommunication and patient care 
errors (Solet et al, 2005).  The discontinuity of care is unavoidable, as one person no 
longer provides patient care 24 hours a day.  In fact, patient care has the potential to be 
transferred several times in a 24-hour period (Solet et al, 2005).   
Patient handoffs occur frequently in the perioperative setting and are frequent 
among anesthesia providers.  Jayaswal et al (2011) reported the transfer of care 
between anesthesia providers usually occurred at least 5 times per operating room prior 
to 3:00pm.  Anesthesia providers (certified registered nurse anesthetists and 
anesthesiologists) perform patient handoffs for bathroom breaks, meal breaks and shift 
changes.  Handoffs also occur when patients are received in the operating room from 
the intensive care unit (ICU) and postoperatively when patient care is transferred to the 
ICU or post-anesthesia recovery unit.   
Given the number of patient handoffs that occur in the operative setting, there is 
considerable risk to the patient from communication failure.  Research reveals 
numerous examples of communication failures occurring in the operating room have 
been reported (Hains, 2012).  A survey of anesthesia providers showed that 84% 
reported giving poor handoffs and 57% reported receiving a poor handoff.  25% of the 
anesthesia providers related an adverse outcome to a poor handoff (Jayaswal et al, 
2011).  Barriers to effective anesthesia hand-off communication are listed in Figure 6 
below. 
Simulation 
Simulation is a technique, not a technology, used to replace or augment real  
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experiences with guided, simulated experiences that evoke or replicate most aspects of 
the real world in a fully interactive manner (Gaba, 2004).  The experience is immersive, 
so that participants are involved in the task or setting as they would be in the real world. 
Experience shows that participants in immersive simulations suspend disbelief and act 
much like they do in their clinical setting (Gaba, 2004).  Simulation has been used 
extensively in aviation, nuclear power production and armed forces training.  Healthcare 
is now following their lead, using simulation to manage hazards and complexity.   
 
Figure 6.  Barriers to Effective Anesthesia Hand-Off Communication 
 
In the current safety climate, it is not acceptable for novice learners to practice 
basic skills on real patients with the risks of error and harm (Kneebone et al, 2004).  
Ethically, it is important to minimize the risk to the patient when possible. With 
simulation learning, students and practitioners develop and refine skills without putting 
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patients at risk.  Hotchkiss et al (2002) noted that simulation offered modestly authentic 
and nonhazardous opportunities for both pedagogy and clinical experience.   
Simulation allows learners to fail and provides a learning opportunity that would 
not be possible with a real patient.  This allows students to learn from their own 
mistakes.  Just as important, it allows students to learn vicariously from the mistakes of 
others (Biddle et al, 2005).  Simulation is used in most nurse anesthesia programs to 
teach basic technical skills such as IV insertion and airway management techniques.  
High-fidelity simulation is also used in nurse anesthesia education to improve teamwork 
and critical thinking skills crisis resource management (CRM) and factors involved in 
human error (Hotchkiss et al, 2002). 
The IOM recognized the potential for simulation to reduce medical errors and 
patient harm.  The IOM recommended the use of simulation and team training to 
improve patient care, care systems, processes and ultimately patient safety (Kohn et al, 
2000).  The IOM report also recommended increased funding of simulation research, 
improved simulation technologies and an increase in the number of simulation centers.  
Simulation training provides for skill development as well as the ability to integrate 
knowledge, clinical judgment, communication and teamwork into practice (Murray, 
2005).  Simulation is also considered an emerging tool to identify latent hazards within 
healthcare systems (Shear et al, 2013).  
Simulation is utilized by many industries to promote team communication, 
procedural skill training, and educational evaluations (Hunt et al, 2007).  Medical 
simulation provides an immersive and interactive clinical experience for the learner.  
Simulation offers realistic, experiential learning without the added risk to the patient.  
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Simulation is now considered a key technique for decreasing error, increasing patient 
safety and identifying and correcting the human factors that affect clinical outcome 
(Brindley & Dunn, 2009).   
The simulation setting allows for evaluation of patient handoffs without risk to the 
patient.  This environment allows the learner to make mistakes, which can be identified 
and corrected during the debriefing.  There is widespread use of simulation in the VCU 
nurse anesthesia program.  The Center for Research in Human Simulation (CRHS) is 
housed at the Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) in the Nurse Anesthesia 
Department.  This is a state of the art facility designed to look and feel like a real 
operating room environment. 
Simulation is used to teach skill development, familiarity with the OR 
environment, anesthetic sequences and crisis management.  The videos that will be 
used for this study are all Anesthesia Crisis Resource Management (ACRM) scenarios.  
These are realistic scenarios that challenge the participants to use critical thinking, 
teamwork and communication skills. 
The experience of simulation allows the researchers to observe patient handoffs 
without risk to patient safety yet the realism of high-fidelity simulation will allow the study 
results to be generalized to the target population.  Simulation also facilitates the 
observation of participants with audiovisual technologies and audio-taping.  This is 
critical for researching the communications that occur during the handoff process. 
This study will observe the handoff process of anesthetists in a simulated 
operating room environment.  The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of 
latent conditions on the handoff process.  The handoff process during simulated 
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anesthetics will be observed and coded to determine the type and number of latent 
conditions that occur during an anesthesia patient handoff.  Coding will also observe the 
quantity and quality of handoff content to determine if a relationship exists between 
latent conditions and handoff content. 
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Chapter Three:  Methodology 
 
There is limited research that correlates system failures (latent conditions) with 
human failures (low quality handoffs) during the anesthesia patient handoff process. 
Research is needed to examine the relationship between system failures (latent 
conditions) and human failures (low quality handoffs) during the anesthesia patient 
handoff process.  This study will determine whether the presence of latent conditions 
contributes to poor anesthesia handoffs. 
The purposes of this study is to: 
1- Identify latent conditions that are present during the handoff. 
2- Identify communication failures during anesthesia patient handoffs performed 
 in a simulated OR environment. 
3- Correlate the latent conditions to handoff scores during the simulated 
 anesthesia patient handoff. 
This is a non-experimental, observational study because there is no manipulation 
of the independent variable (Polit & Beck, 2008). This correlation study is designed to 
explore the strength of the relationship between the independent variable, which is 
latent conditions, and the dependent variable, which is the handoff score (Figure 7).  
The null hypothesis is that no relationship exists between latent conditions present 
during the anesthesia patient handoff and the handoff quality (judged by a handoff 
score). 
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Figure 7.  Constructs and Variables 
 
The setting for this study will be The Center for Research in Human Simulation 
(CRHS) at the Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) in the Nurse Anesthesia 
Department.  It is a 1500-foot simulation facility that has two full-body Laerdal patient 
simulators (Vital Sim; Laerdal Medical Corp.. Wappingers Falls, New York), which are 
used in a simulated operating room environment. The CRHS is dedicated to integrating 
simulation in the graduate curriculum, advancing the art and science of anesthesiology, 
and improving patient safety (sahp.vcu.edu/nrsa/simulation, 2014).   State-of-the-art 
audiovisual equipment allows scenarios to be recorded and archived for subsequent 
study and analysis.  The educational approach is for learning to occur in a realistic 
Constructs	  
Communication	  Patient	  safety	  
	  Latent	  Conditions	   Handoff	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operating room environment to promote effective learning.  The simulation center is set-
up to look exactly like a real operating room.  In addition to a high-fidelity simulator, the 
simulation center also includes an anesthesia gas machine, medication and equipment 
carts and monitors, exactly as an operating room would. 
The CRHS has an extensive video library of surgical and anesthesia simulations 
from crisis resource management scenarios.  Videos from 2006 to the present are 
available for study.  From this convenience sample, 60 patient handoffs (n=60) will be 
selected for this study.  Scenarios will be randomly selected from the video library by 
the director of information technology in the VCU nurse anesthesia department.  In 
selecting this sample size as part of performing a power analysis, this number is twice 
the required sample size previously reported in the literature.  Weller et al, (2003) 
evaluated anesthetist performance in simulation using a sample size of 28 to 
demonstrate validity in the assessment of clinical practice using simulation.  Hulley et al, 
(2007) report a sample size of 26 is needed for a predicted correlation coefficient of 
0.60 with a one-tailed test and an alpha of 0.05.  The proposed larger sample size was 
chosen to provide the researchers with more learning opportunities with data collection 
and to strengthen the methodological validity and rigor of this study.  The videos will be 
randomly selected from the library and placed on a DVD for coding by the coding team 
(see below).   
The participants in the simulation scenarios included anesthesiologists, certified 
registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) and student registered nurse anesthetists 
(SRNAs).  The scenarios were created for the purpose of anesthesia crisis resource 
management training and the participants were instructed to perform their anesthetic 
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care as they would in the operating room setting.  The participants in these scenarios 
did not receive special training in anesthesia patient handoffs prior to their simulation, 
nor were they aware that their handoff was being evaluated.  
 The simulation participants arrived at the simulation center and were briefed on 
the simulated operating room environment, room set-up, patient history and the surgery 
being performed.  The participants were presented with a standardized anesthesia 
scenario.  The scenario represented a common operating room case and anesthetic 
management.  At some point during the case, a patient handoff will occur between the 
anesthesia provider who is being relieved and the anesthesia provider who is providing 
the relief.  The handoff process only, from beginning to end, will be evaluated for this 
study.   Because the scenarios were designed for anesthesia crisis management, the 
handoffs were not scripted or planned. 
Written informed consent was obtained from each participant and is on file in the 
Department of Nurse Anesthesia.  Participants consented to having their simulation 
video and audiotaped and also consented for having their video archived for future 
quality assurance and research purposes.  Participant names and other identifying 
information will not be used on the coding forms.  Participants will not be identified in 
any way during the study to insure confidentiality.  The inclusion criterion for this study 
is a simulation video that includes an anesthesia patient handoff with audio and visual 
quality that allows for evaluation.  Exclusion criteria include simulation videos that do not 
contain a handoff or simulations with poor audio/visual content that prevent coding.  
Institutional review board (IRB) approval will be obtained from the Virginia 
Commonwealth University (Richmond, VA).  
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Simulation videos will be evaluated and coded by five researchers from the study 
team that have completed extensive training. All coders are experienced registered 
nurses with practical experience in patient handoffs.  All coders are also familiar with the 
handoff literature and the safety concerns associated with patient handoffs.  Coders will 
also complete training on the use of the VCU Anesthesia Coding Instrument and the 
operational definitions that will be used for this study.  Each coder will receive a DVD 
with the identical 60 simulation cases.  Coding will be performed by each of the five 
researchers independently.  
The research team met to discuss the coding of the simulation videos.  The first 
meeting was conducted via video teleconference to discuss the key elements that would 
be necessary for a complete anesthesia patient handoff.  The handoff literature had 
been reviewed to determine the key elements of an anesthesia patient handoff.  The 
team agreed that the ten-handoff content items listed under heading number 3 on the 
Anesthesia Handoff Coding Instrument (Appendix B) were necessary for a complete 
transfer of information during the anesthesia patient handoff.   
Each handoff video will be evaluated for whether the handoff content item is 
present and will be recorded as a yes/no response.  The outcome being measured is 
the handoff score that indicates whether handoff content items were discussed.  A 
maximum score of 10 would indicate that all handoff content items were discussed.   
A minimum score of 0 would indicate that no handoff content items were discussed.  
Each handoff content item is also operationally defined for coding purposes (Appendix 
A). 
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The literature was also reviewed to determine the most common latent conditions 
identified that occur during handoffs.  Latent conditions are innate, mostly hidden, 
workplace factors that may become the central cause of or an exacerbating factor in 
adverse patient outcomes (Reason, 1990).  Studies in other industries have shown that 
latent conditions can be a key variable that allows for errors. Although latent conditions 
have been studied in other fields such as aerospace, aviation, nuclear power, business 
management, and military operation, few studies exist in the medical literature that seek 
to demonstrate how latent conditions may affect medical practice (Lighthall et al, 2010).  
Coders will look for the presence of the following four latent conditions during the 
simulated anesthesia patient handoffs:  
1-distractions 
2-production pressure  
3-one-way communication  
4-handoff timing at critical points. 
These four latent conditions are commonly identified in the literature (van 
Beuzedom et al, 2010; Joint Commission, 2007; Feil, 2014; Lane-Fall et al, 2014).  
Distractions are the most common latent condition in anesthetic practice (Campbell et 
al, 2012).  The Joint Commission (2007) identified that interactive two-way 
communication was critical to a successful handoff process.  Handoffs should not occur 
at “task-dense” critical points of the case.  Handoffs that occur at this time are shown to 
result in increased errors. 
Each handoff video will be evaluated for whether the latent condition item is 
present and will be recorded as a yes/no response.  The predictor variable being 
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measured is the latent condition (communication characteristics) score that indicates 
how many latent conditions were present during the anesthesia patient handoff.  A 
maximum score of 4 would indicate that all latent conditions were present.  A minimum 
score of 0 would indicate that no latent conditions were present.  The null hypothesis is 
that no relationship exists between latent conditions and handoff score. Each of these 
latent conditions is given an operational definition in the Coding Instrument Definitions 
under the heading “Communication Characteristics” (Appendix A). 
Initially the team will evaluate three videos to determine interrater reliability using 
the Kappa statistic.  Because there are five independent observers/coders, reliability 
assessment is needed to determine the amount of agreement about the scoring on an 
instrument (Polit & Beck, 2008).  If a high level of agreement is achieved then the 
assumption is that measurement and coding errors are minimal.  The study group 
meetings and the operational definitions are designed to enhance the reliability ratings.  
Interrater reliability will be assessed using a multi-rater kappa (Fleiss, 1971) because 
there are more than two raters.  The goal will be to achieve a kappa of greater than 0.60 
which is generally considered the minimally acceptable value. 
As an integral part of the team training process, the study group will meet again 
after coding the first three randomly selected simulations to review the interrater 
reliability. We will look for inconsistencies and will correct any problems or 
misunderstandings with the coding tool and the operational definitions.  It is important 
that the operational definitions are clear as greater clarity allows for greater reliability 
(Polit & Beck, 2008).  We will also examine each item of the handoff content for 
retention, modification or deletion. 
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 Validity is also an important criterion for measurement instruments.  Validity is 
the degree to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure (Polit & 
Beck, 2008).  The content validity for this study is strengthened by using several handoff 
studies in the literature to create the list of handoff content that is considered important 
for the anesthesia patient handoff (Figure 8).   Face validity is demonstrated by having 
experienced, domain-familiar coders experienced in the patient handoff process create 
the coding instrument. Evidence for construct validity will be demonstrated using 
hypothesized relationships to show the relationship between patient handoffs and latent 
conditions. 
 
McQueen-Shadfar and Taekman 
(2010) 
Used I PASS the BATON pneumonic 
Lane-Fall et al (2014) Used I PASS pneumonic 
Saager et al (2014) No standardized handoff format 
Wright (2013) Used PATIENT pneumonic 
Salzwedel (2013) Used a checklist 
Kalkman (2010) Used a checklist 
 
Figure 8.  Anesthesia handoff content studies 
The data collection tool (Appendix B) will be used to gather data about the 
independent variable (communication characteristics/latent conditions) and the 
dependent variable (handoff content).  There are four communication characteristics 
and they are either present (yes response) or absent (no response).  There are ten 
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handoff content items.  Each handoff items is either communicated (yes response) or 
not communicated (no response).  Each of the five coders will complete a VCU 
anesthesia handoff coding instrument form for each of the 60 cases and the data will be 
entered into a spreadsheet (excel) for analysis. 
A combination of statistical techniques will be utilized to organize, interpret and 
communicate the numerical data.  Descriptive statistics will provide a range of values for 
the latent conditions and the handoff scores.  When calculating central tendency values 
for the 5 coders, the mode will be used because it is most suitable to nominal level 
measurements (Field, 2009).  Frequency of occurrence will also be determined for 
latent conditions and handoff scores.  The frequencies of each latent condition will be 
determined to show how often the conditions were present during the handoff.  The 
frequencies for handoff content will show which content items were missed and how 
often.   A frequency distribution table will be used to show frequency and percentage 
data.  Histograms will be used to show the distribution of latent conditions and handoff 
scores. 
Correlation testing will be calculated using a Spearman’s correlation coefficient or 
a Spearman’s rho.  Spearman’s rho is a non-parametric statistic and will be used in 
place of the parametric statistic Pearson’s r because of the use of nominal data 
(Pearson’s r requires interval or ratio data).  It will be a one-tailed test as the hypothesis 
is directional. 
Spearman’s rho is both descriptive and inferential.  As a descriptive measure, the 
correlation coefficient summarizes the magnitude and direction of a relationship 
between two variables.  As an inferential measure, the correlation coefficient tests 
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hypotheses about population correlations (Polit & Beck, 2008).   Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient can range from -1 to 1.   A value of 1 indicates a perfect positive relationship 
while an r value of -1 indicates a perfect negative linear relationship.  A value of 0 
indicates that no linear relationship exists.  A significance value of less than .05 will be 
used to determine that there is a significant relationship between latent factors and 
handoff scores.  A scatter-plot diagram will be used to visually depict the correlation of 
the latent conditions and handoff score. 
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Chapter Four:  Data Analysis 
 
Communication failure is the leading cause of patient harm due to healthcare-
related errors.  Communication failure is known to occur during anesthesia patient 
handoffs.  Latent conditions, such as distractions or production pressure, allow errors to 
proceed through system defenses and cause harm.   The purpose of this study is to 
determine the effect of latent conditions on the communication that occurs during the 
patient handoff process. 
Simulated anesthesia handoff videos were randomly selected from a large 
database of anesthesia crisis resource management videos at the VCU Nurse 
Anesthesia Program’s, Center for Research in Human Simulation.  Five trained raters 
reviewed the videos and used the VCU anesthesia handoff coding form for data 
collection.  All of the forms were collected by the principal investigator and entered into 
an Excel spreadsheet.  A pilot study was conducted reviewing three simulated 
anesthesia patient handoff videos to gather data for interrater reliability determination 
and for use with the sample size estimation.   
The agreement between two-raters is typically measured using Cohen’s kappa 
coefficient (Gross, 1986).  Cohen’s kappa is not appropriate for this study because there 
are more than two raters.  However, when there are more than two raters, a Fleiss’ 
kappa is useful to determine multi-rater reliability (Fleiss, 1971).  Fleiss’ kappa was 
calculated to be 0.79 for the five raters in this study.  After completing the data analysis, 
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one rater (rater four) was dropped from the study due to a large amount of missing data 
(see discussion on missing data).  Fleiss’ kappa was calculated again using four raters 
and the resulting kappa was 0.90 (see Table 1).  Kappa values of 0.75 or greater 
indicate excellent agreement (Fleiss, 1971 & Polit and Beck, 2008). 
 
Table 1.  Fleiss’ Kappa for Multirater Reliability (four raters) 
    
N 10 number of items 
  
n 4 number of raters 
    
k 2 number of categories 
  
Appy Scenario 
   
  
Categories 
Sum of 
squares 
1/n(n-1) Pi 
 
Content Number of 0's 
Number of 
1's 
 
a 0 4 16 0.083333333 1.00 
 
b 0 4 16 0.083333333 1.00 
 
c 4 0 16 0.083333333 1.00 
 
d 0 4 16 0.083333333 1.00 
 
e 0 4 16 0.083333333 1.00 
 
f 4 0 16 0.083333333 1.00 
 
g 0 4 16 0.083333333 1.00 
 
h 4 0 16 0.083333333 1.00 
 
i 4 0 16 0.083333333 1.00 
 
j 1 3 10 0.083333333 0.50 
 
sums 17 23 
   
 
N x n 40 40 
 
SUM of Pi 9.50 
sums / Nxn 0.425 0.575 
 
P bar 0.95 
(sums / Nxn) 
squared 0.180625 0.330625 
   
 
Pe 0.51125 
    
       
  
Kappa (Fleiss) 0.898 
  
Hulley (2007) reported that a sample size of 26 would be recommended for a 
correlation coefficient of 0.60 with a one-tailed test with an alpha of 0.05 and a beta of 
0.80.  The sample size was calculated using data from the pilot study of three cases.  
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The calculation was performed with an alpha of 0.05 and a beta of 0.80 and an effect 
size (Spearman’s rho, one-tailed) of -0.427 from this pilot study.  The sample size 
calculation (Appendix C) recommended a sample size of 33 cases.  The literature and 
sample size calculation indicated a sample size of approximately thirty would be 
necessary for a correlation of 0.60.  For this study the recommended sample size was 
doubled to increase the methodological rigor.  Therefore, Sixty cases (n=60) were 
studied to strengthen validity of this study and to account for possible missing rater 
scores or videos that could not be rated. 
Of the 60 cases reviewed, two were excluded from the study.  Case number 51 
was excluded because an anesthesia patient handoff did not occur during this case.  
Case number 53 was excluded because of poor audio content that made the anesthesia 
handoff review impossible.  With the two exclusions, the sample size for this study was 
58 cases (n=58). 
All researchers have faced the problem of missing quantitative data at some 
point in their work (Pigott, 2001).  The missing values result in deciding how to best to 
analyze the data without jeopardizing methodological rigor.  There were missing values 
on 16 of the 58 cases.  Rater two had missing values on three of the cases and rater 
four had missing values on 16 cases (overlap in three of the cases).  Due to the high 
number of missing values, the scores from rater four were excluded from the study.  
After the exclusion of rater four, only three missing values remained out of 232 reviewed 
cases (58 cases x four raters).   The missing values were on the handoff scores (all 
latent condition values were recorded) and in each case were one of the ten-handoff 
content items.   
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One strategy for missing values is to delete those cases.  Cases were not 
deleted in this study though as the loss of cases can have a large impact on power 
when the sample size is small (Polit and Beck, 2008).  Rather than using imputation or 
mean substitution for missing values, the median scores of the other three raters were 
calculated and used for the score.  The effect of the missing data is minimized by 
having multiple reviewers and by using the median scores for each variable.  When 
median scoring resulted in a non-integer (1.5 rather than 1 or 2), the lesser value was 
included to avoid inflating the scoring. 
 Each simulated anesthesia handoff case was reviewed and produced two 
scores, a latency score and a handoff score. The latency score (from 0-4) is based on 
the number of latent conditions that were present during the handoff.  A score of zero 
indicated that no latent conditions were present and a score of four indicated that all 
four latent conditions were present.  The handoff score (from 0-10) is based on the 
handoff content that was communicated.  A score of zero indicated that no handoff 
content was communicated and a score of ten indicated that all the handoff content was 
communicated.  The latent total score (Table 2) and the handoff total score (Table 3) 
were determined for each case and each rater.  The median value of the four-raters 
produced the latent score and the handoff score for each video reviewed. 
• Research Question One: 
• What are the frequencies of latent conditions that occur during the 
anesthesia patient handoff? 
Descriptive statistics were performed using SPSS statistical software.  The 
frequency of each latent condition was tabulated.  Distractions were the most common 
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Table 2.  Latency Scores 
                      
 
Table 3.  Handoff Scores 
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latent condition and were present in 47 (81%) of the cases.  Production pressure was 
present in 16 (28%) of the cases.  Twelve cases (21%) did not have two-way interactive 
communications and 14 (24%) did not handoff with safe relief timing.  There were no 
latent conditions in 11 (19%) of the cases, one latent condition present in 29 (50%) of 
the cases, two latent conditions present in 12 (20.7%) of the cases, three latent 
conditions present in three (5.1%) of the cases and four latent conditions present in 
three (5.2%) of the cases. 
The following handoff items were communicated with a high frequency; patient ID 
(81%), procedure (91%), review of systems (85%), medications (81%), anesthesia 
technique (81%), and pertinent events (71%).  Airway technique was communicated 
53% of the time.  Two handoff items that were infrequently communicated were vital 
signs, 29% of the time and intake and output, 26% of the time. 
 The latent conditions (Figure 9) and the handoff scores (Figure 10) were graphed 
and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was conducted to determine whether the scores 
were normally distributed (Table 4).  The p-value for latency was 0.004 indicating a non-
normal distribution.  The p-value for handoff score is 0.051, just meeting the significance 
for a normal distribution. 
• Research Question Two: 
• Is there an association between latent conditions and handoff scores? 
 A correlation statistic is necessary to assess the effect of latent conditions on 
handoff scores.  The latency and handoff scores are ordinal data and the latency scores 
are not normally distributed.  Because the data violated the parametric assumption of 
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Figure 9.  Distribution of Latency Scores 
 
                               
Figure 10.  Distribution of Handoff Scores 
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Table 4.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov Normality Test 
                   
being normally distributed (Field, 2009) and since the data is not ratio or interval level a 
non-parametric test is required.   Therefore, the non-parametric, Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient  (Spearman’s rho) is used in place of the parametric, Pearson’s r correlation 
coefficient.  The Spearman’s correlation coefficient is a bivariate measure of 
correlation/association that is employed by rank-ordering the data (Sheskin, 1997).  The 
study hypothesis, that handoff scores are inversely related to latency scores, is 
directional, so a one-tailed test is used (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Spearman’s Correlation 
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The Spearman’s correlation shows output for the variables handoff score and 
latency score.  The Spearman’s correlation coefficient value can range from -1.0 to 
+1.0. The correlation coefficient between latency and handoff scores was -0.422 with a 
p-value less than 0.001.  This indicates a significant relationship between the latency 
and handoff scores.  Since the correlation coefficient is negative, it indicates an inverse 
relationship between the variables.  The inverse relationship indicates that as latency 
scores increase, handoff scores decrease (Figure 11).  The coefficient  -0.422, indicates 
a moderate inverse relationship between latency and handoff scores.  Values of 0.1 
represent a small effect, 0.3 a medium effect and 0.5 a large effect (Field, 2009).  The r 
value was calculated for both the linear and curvilinear regression on the data.  The 
higher R2 0.45 vs. 0.60 indicates that the curvilinear scatterplot provides a better 
estimate of variability between the variables.  The R2, the coefficient of determination, is 
a measure of the amount of variability in one variable that is shared by the other (Field, 
2009).  The R2 of 0.60 for the curvilinear relationship demonstrates that 60% of the 
variability in handoff scores can be attributed to the latent conditions.  The curvilinear 
relationship (Figure 12) shows that high latency scores may predict low handoff scores 
but as latency score drops to two or less, the handoff scores tend to cluster in the higher 
range (from five to nine). 
 Table 6 is a frequency distribution for the handoff scores.  The table provides the 
percent that each latent condition was present for that handoff score.  This table shows 
that there were few handoffs with very low or very high scores.  The highest percentage 
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Figure 11.  Scatterplot with Linear Relationship 
 
              
Figure 12.  Scatterplot with Curvilinear Relationship 
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Table 6.  Frequency Distribution of Latency and Handoff Scores 
 
Latency Factors 
Distractions Production Pressure 
Not 
Interactive 
Not 
Safe to 
Relieve 
n 
0 100.0% 91.7% 91.7% 83.3% 3 
1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 75.0% 1 
2 83.3% 50.0% 66.7% 0.0% 2 
3 100.0% 30.0% 20.0% 0.0% 2 
4 68.8% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 4 
5 59.1% 18.2% 36.4% 18.2% 7 
6 72.1% 11.6% 18.6% 14.0% 11 
7 63.0% 11.1% 3.7% 13.0% 13 
8 69.8% 23.3% 0.0% 7.0% 9 
9 63.2% 15.8% 0.0% 5.3% 5 
10 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1 
 
of handoff scores was in the range of scores from five to eight.  The most common 
latent condition was distractions, followed by production pressure, not interactive and 
not safe to relieve. 
 The Spearman’s correlation coefficient suggests that increasing latency scores 
leads to lower handoff scores but it does indicate which of the latent conditions is most 
predictive of handoff score.  A multiple regression analysis was performed (see Table 7) 
to show the predictive value of each latent condition in the handoff score.  The latency 
variable, “not interactive”, was the most significant predictor of handoff scores, B = -3.36 
(p < .001) and was followed by safe relief timing which was also a significant predictor, 
B=-0.230 (p< 0.05). 
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Table 7.  Multiple Regression Analysis of Latent Conditions 
      
Summary 
 This study examined the relationship of latent factors and handoff scores of 58 
simulated anesthesia patient handoffs.  Four raters reviewed the videos of the 58 cases 
and provided a latency score (number of latent conditions) and a handoff score.  Fleiss’ 
kappa for the four raters is 0.90, indicating a high level of inter-rater reliability.  
Therefore, the median latent score and median handoff score of the four raters were 
provided for each of the 58 cases. 
 The most common latent condition revealed in the analysis was distractions.  
Distractions were present in 81% of the cases, followed in frequency, by production 
pressure, observed in 28% of the cases.  Handoff timing “not safe to relieve” was 
observed in 24% of the cases and handoffs that were “not interactive” was observed in 
21% of the cases.   The majority of handoffs (70%) were judged to be either good or 
excellent, with a handoff score between 6 and 10.  The majority of handoff items were 
frequently communicated.  The exceptions were airway technique (communicated in 
53% of cases), vital signs (communicated in 29% of the cases) and intake and output 
(communicated in 21% of the cases). 
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 The lowest handoff scores (0,1 or 2) were associated with three or more latent 
conditions.  Handoff scores were high even when distractions and production pressure 
were present.  This seems to indicate that handoffs can be good or excellent with 0, 1 or 
2 latent conditions present but when there are 3 or more latent conditions, handoffs 
quality invariably degraded to poor handoff scores.  An interesting finding was that 
handoffs scores were higher if they were interactive and perform at safe times.  Handoff 
scores were lower when the handoff was “not interactive” and “not safe to relieve..  This 
is validated by the multiple regression analysis demonstrating a significant relationship 
between handoffs that were not interactive and not safe to relieve and handoff scores. 
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Chapter Five:  Conclusion and Summary 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the research study.  It also highlights 
important conclusions drawn from the data presented in chapter 4.  This chapter 
provides a discussion of the implications for action and recommendations for further 
research. 
Research Summary 
Every day patients are harmed by medical errors.  Despite the goals of providing 
safe and effective patient care, healthcare is not as safe as it should be.  A recent 
estimate by James (2013), reports that death from preventable harm in US hospitals is 
between 210,00 to 400,00 deaths per year.  A lot of research money and numerous 
resources are devoted to help solve this patient safety epidemic.  
Healthcare is learning lessons from other industries on how to improve patient 
safety.  Current error theory explains that medical errors are not usually caused by 
careless providers but are the result of defective systems.  Patient safety is now 
benefitting from systems-level error analysis that has been long employed in aviation.  
The systems-based approach to error investigation shifted the focus to prospective 
systemic safety remedies and prophylaxis, rather than on assessment of blame.   
The systems approach assumes that humans are fallible and that systems need 
to be designed to prevent and absorb inevitable human error.  The systems approach 
also emphasizes attention to organizational and environmental factors that are 
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precursors to individual errors.  When the environment allows for errors by individuals, 
the environment can be searched for underlying conditions that have recognized or 
tolerated (van Beuzekom, et al, 2010).   
James Reason (1990) described the “Swiss cheese model” designed for accident 
investigations in the aviation, nuclear power and railway industries.  Reason explained 
that latent conditions are present in a system long before an error occurs and allow an 
error to proceed through defenses and cause harm.  Evidence shows that discovering 
and neutralizing latent conditions will have a much greater effect on system safety than 
efforts to minimize active errors (Reason, 1990). 
In healthcare, as well as in aviation, communication failures are well known to be 
a leading cause of errors.  Root cause analysis from the Joint Commission associates 
communication failure with over 60% of reported sentinel events in hospitals (Joint 
Commission, 2006) and the Federal Aviation Association associates communication 
failure with 70% of commercial aviation accidents (NTSB, 2006).  Communication 
quality can be undermined by a lack of information or misinformation or even too much 
information (cognitive overload). 
There are additional factors that can lead to communication failure.  Prielipp, et al 
(2010) described phenomenom of “normalization of deviance.”  This is an incremental 
process and a gradual erosion of standard procedures that would never be tolerated as 
a single event.  Normalization of deviance tolerates more risk and more errors, always 
in the interest of efficiency.  This process is a small, gradual movement and without 
incident, these deviant changes become “normalized.”  Poor communication and the 
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“normalization of deviance” are identified as human factors that contribute to anesthesia 
mishaps (Prielipp et al, 2010). 
Communication failures are known to occur during patient handoffs between 
caregivers.  The handoff process is the transfer of patient care and responsibility among 
caregivers.   Handoffs are inevitable and necessary as care is transferred among 
providers.  Patient handoffs take place frequently in anesthesia during breaks, shift 
changes or transfers of patients to and from the operating room.   Anesthesia patient 
handoffs have been identified as a vulnerable time for patients as communication 
failures commonly occur at these transitions in care.  
 The Joint Commission acknowledges the risk of communication failures during 
the handoff process and prioritizes handoffs as one of their major National Patient 
Safety Goals (NPSG).  The Joint Commission has called for a standardization of 
handoff communications.   The Joint Commission also identified latent conditions that 
frequently contribute to communication failure.  The Joint Commission NPSG 2E (2006) 
stated that handoffs should include interactive, two-way communication; should limit 
interruptions or distractions and should allow for a review of relevant data. 
There is a scarcity of research that correlates latent conditions with the quality of 
handoff content.   The purpose of this study was to identify latent conditions that are 
present during the anesthesia patient handoff and to correlate the latent condition score 
with the handoff content score during simulated anesthesia patient handoffs.  The 
research questions are: 
• What are the frequencies of latent conditions that occur during the 
anesthesia patient handoff? 
	  	   65	  
• Is there an association between latent condition scores and handoff 
scores? 
The research hypothesis is that “handoff scores are inversely related to latent condition 
scores.” 
 This was a nonexperimental, observational study.  Simulation center videos from 
the Center for Research in Human Simulation (CRHS) at the Virginia Commonwealth 
University’s Nurse Anesthesia Program were examined for latent conditions and handoff 
content.  The simulations were conducted between 2006 to the present.  The realistic 
simulation experiences took place during anesthesia crisis resource management 
training. The participants in the simulation scenarios included anesthesiologists, 
certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) and student registered nurse 
anesthetists (SRNAs). They were instructed to perform their anesthetic care as they 
would in the operating room setting.  
The participants in these scenarios did not receive special training in anesthesia 
patient handoffs prior to their simulation, nor were they aware that the handoff process 
was being evaluated.  Written informed consent was obtained from each participant and 
is on file in the Department of Nurse Anesthesia.  Institutional review board (IRB) 
approval was obtained from the Virginia Commonwealth University (Richmond, VA). 
Videos were evaluated and coded by four researchers from the study team that have 
completed extensive training. 
 Sixty videos were randomly selected from the CRHS video library.  All four raters 
reviewed each video.  The VCU anesthesia handoff coding form (appendix B) was 
utilized for data collection.  Raters evaluated each archived scenario for the following 
	  	   66	  
latent conditions; distractions, production pressure, communication that was not 
interactive and handoff timing that was not safe.  Latent condition scoring could range 
from zero (no latent conditions) to four (all latent conditions present).  The handoff was 
also evaluated for the communication of ten handoff criteria including patient 
identification, procedure identification, allergies, review of systems, medications, vital 
signs, anesthesia technique, airway technique, intake and output and pertinent events.  
Each item was operationally defined (appendix A).  The handoff score could range from 
zero (no handoff content communicated) to ten (all handoff content communicated).    
 Two cases were excluded from the study due to poor audio quality.  Sample size 
calculation indicated that 33 cases would be needed for a one-tailed Spearman’s 
correlation with an alpha of 0.05 and a beta of 0.80.  The final sample size of 58 cases 
strengthened the methodological rigor and validy of this study.  Reliability was 
determined using a Fleiss’ kappa for multirater reliability.  Fleiss’ kappa was 0.90 
indicating excellent agreement among 4 raters.  The most common latent condition 
observed during the anesthesia handoffs was the spectrum of conditions known as 
distractions (81%).   Production pressure was present in 28% of anesthesia handoffs, 
handoff timing was “not safe to relieve” in 24% of the handoffs and handoffs were “not 
interactive in 21% of the cases.   
Major Findings 
 Handoff scores were low (0,1,2) when three or more latent conditions were 
present.  The presence of two or fewer latent conditions was not predictive of low 
handoff scores.  Handoff scores were high (9 or 10) even in the presence of both 
distractions and production pressure.  Handoff scores were only significantly predicted 
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by the latent conditions “not interactive” (p < 0.001) and “not safe to relieve” (p< 0.05) 
using multiple regression analysis.   
A Spearman’s correlation coefficient of -0.422 suggests a significant (p< 0.001) 
inverse relationship between latency scores and handoff scores.   Linear regression 
demonstrates a curvilinear relationship between latent conditions and handoff scores.  
This shows a stronger relationship between high latent condition scores and low 
handoffs scores.  The R2 value of 0.60 indicates that 60% of the variability in handoff 
scores can be attributed to latent conditions. 
The purpose of this research was to discover the latent conditions present during 
the anesthesia handoff process and to identify the relationship between latent 
conditions and handoff communication.  The Joint Commission urges that the handoff 
process should be free of interruptions and distractions.  They also suggest that the 
handoff process should be highly interactive.  There is also evidence from a wide range 
of high-profile, safety-conscious industries (commercial aviation, nuclear power, military, 
NASA) that handoffs should not occur during task dense situations.    
The handoff literature indicates that distractions and interruptions are barriers to 
safe patient handoffs.  Distractions and interruptions are common in the operating room 
and were common during the simulations (81% of the cases).  However distractions 
were not predictive of handoff scores in this study (p>0.05). One reason for this finding 
could be that providers are so used to distractions that they are able to “work around” 
this latent condition.   
Production pressure is very common in the surgical and anesthetic care 
environment.  Production pressure can lead to a hurried handoff and communication 
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failure.   Production pressure also was not predictive (p>0.05) of handoff scores for this 
study.  It was thought that these two latent conditions, distractions and production 
pressure, would have more of an effect on handoff scores but in fact, some handoff 
scores were very high (9 or 10) even in the presence of both distractions and production 
pressure.  Again, an explanation could be that providers are used to overcoming 
distractions and productions and were able to provide quality handoff communications 
despite these latent conditions.  Error theory and the “normalization of deviance” explain 
that despite the successes of overcoming these latent conditions, eventually the system 
will fail and harm will occur from these latent conditions. 
Unexpected Findings 
Surprisingly, the latent condition “not interactive” was the greatest predictor of 
handoff scores and was significant  (p<0.001).  When handoff scores were low (0,1,2) 
the handoffs were frequently “not interactive.”  When handoff scores were high (8,9,10) 
the handoffs were always interactive.  This indicates that the seemingly straightforward 
act of communicating is anything but straightforward.  As stated by George Bernard 
Shaw, “the problem with communication…is the illusion that it has been accomplished.” 
Relief timing was also a significant factor in this study.  The literature shows that 
communication failures are common during task dense situations (such as aviation 
take-offs or landings).   Communication failure has also been an issue during 
anesthesia handoffs when the handoff occurs during the induction or emergence phase.  
For this study, handoff scores were generally lower when the handoff was deemed “not 
safe to relieve.” 
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Link to Theory 
Communication failures contribute to patient harm during anesthesia patient 
handoffs.   Modern error theory explains that these communication errors are not 
necessarily an individual error.  The recurrence of the same error, in the same situation, 
by different people indicates an error-prone situation rather than error-prone people 
(Peltomaa, 2012).  Error-prone situations arise from conditions in the system called 
latent conditions.  Latent conditions, such as distractions and interruptions, produce two 
tasks going on in parallel which compete for your attention and the elements of one 
migrate into the other (Peltomaa, 2012).   
Latent conditions are often present but rarely cause harm.  Because of this, if you 
do today what you did yesterday and got away with it (no bad outcome) then system 
issues remain concealed.   The concealed system problems become “normalized” 
(normalization of deviance) and a safe system becomes unsafe (Peltomaa, 2012).  This 
is commonly seen in the operating room where distractions and production pressures 
are the norm.  
A robust and growing body of scholarly work is dedicated to improving handoff 
safety.  Current guidelines for safe handoffs tend to focus on standardizing the handoff 
process.  Examples include the evaluation of handoff checklists and handoff 
pneumonics as “forcing functions” in the genesis of effective communication.  This study 
was designed to create a safer system for patient handoffs by examining the 
relationship between latent conditions and communication failures during the anesthesia 
handoff process. 
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Weaknesses 
A weakness for this study was the setting being simulated anesthetics rather 
than “real” anesthetic cases.  It is very difficult to perform observational studies in the 
operating room as this would require permission from the surgical and anesthesia 
providers, as well as obtaining patient consent. The use of observers in the operating 
room could also lead to the Hawthorne effect where handoffs performance is improved 
due the presence of the observer.  The observer effect could also present a problem in 
this study as the participants know that their performance is being watched and 
recorded.  This could lead to higher quality handoffs in this study than in actual practice. 
Another weakness is that each latent condition was considered equal in this 
study.   Latent factors were identified as either present or not present.  For example, if 
music was playing in the background, then a distraction was recorded.  This did not 
indicate whether the music was loud or soft but only that it was present.  During the 
review of the handoffs, it was clear that not all distractions, or any of the other latent 
conditions, were equal in their impact on handoff communication.   It is likely that certain 
latent conditions “outweigh” others.  Future research could quantify the latent conditions 
and provide a weight based on the impact or significance that it has on communication.  
As an example, during task dense periods where it was determined as “not safe to 
relieve” a weight could be added to the score if the handoff communication was 
interrupted.   
This weakness could also be considered strength though.  The simulations were 
conducted in a state-of-the-art, high-fidelity simulation center.  The simulated operating 
room was set-up nearly identical to an actual operating room.  The scenarios were 
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realistic and the operating room team (surgeon, circulating nurse and scrub nurse) was 
present and performing their roles.  The greatest strength of the simulation center was 
that study participants were focused on their anesthetic performance (just like they 
would be in the operating room) and not on the handoff performance.  Because the 
anesthesia patient handoff was just a typical part of their anesthetic management, it 
allowed for a realistic handoff to occur without the caregivers being concerned about 
handoff quality. 
Conclusion 
Anesthesia patient handoffs are a vulnerable time for patient care.  Handoffs 
occur frequently during anesthesia care.  Latent conditions are common during 
anesthesia handoffs.  This research provides evidence that latent conditions can lead to 
poor handoff communication during the anesthesia patient handoff.  The number of 
latent conditions and the types of latent conditions affected handoff scores.  Handoff 
scores were inversely related to increasing latent conditions.  Handoffs that were not 
interactive or handoffs with unsafe timing predictably resulted in poor handoff 
communication. 
Clinicians must acknowledge that handoffs are a high-risk event that can result in 
patient harm.  The complexity of healthcare mandates competent communication to 
ensure safe patient care.  Clear and effective communication is key to safe, quality care.   
Clinicians must be aware that providing a good handoff requires an understanding of 
the purpose, leadership, protected time, a systematic approach, and a supportive 
clinical environment (Jorm et al, 2009).  This includes being aware of and minimizing 
the impact of latent conditions during the anesthesia patient handoff.   
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Future 
Effective communication and good handoffs take effort.  It is important for 
healthcare to learn from the successes of other industries.  Many industries have 
created standardized approaches to the handoff process.  In healthcare, handoffs are 
often individualized and without standardization.  There are examples of effective 
communication and good handoffs that take place in settings with high consequences 
for failure.    
Patterson et al, (2004) studied handoffs from NASA Johnson Space Center, 
nuclear power plants, a railroad dispatch center and an ambulance dispatch center.  
They included the following handoff coordination and communication strategies:  face-
to-face verbal update with interactive questioning, limited interruptions, limit initiation of 
operator actions during update, incoming assesses current status, incoming scans 
historical data before update, outgoing oversees incoming’s work following update and 
delay the transfer of responsibility when concerned about status/stability of process.  
These strategies provide for a systematic approach and protected time for the handoff.  
These strategies also address several latent conditions while providing a supportive 
environment for the handoff to occur. 
Durso et al (2007) described the four phases of a handoff that occur for air traffic 
controllers.  Phase 1, end of shift, is when the outgoing prepares for the handoff 
meeting while the incoming attempts to gather information.  Phase 2, arrival, is the face-
to-face meeting.  During phase 2, the outgoing maintains control while the incoming 
observes and gains information.  Phase 3 is the verbal exchange between outgoing and 
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incoming. Phase four, taking post, is when the incoming assumes responsibility.  The 
outgoing remains present for a short time to ensure handoff is complete. 
These examples from other industries demonstrate the importance of defining 
the handoff process.  W. E. Deming stated “If people do not see the process, they 
cannot improve it.”  Anesthesia handoffs lack the defining properties described above.   
Future study could test these strategies for effectiveness during the anesthesia handoff. 
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Appendix A 
	  
	  
 
	  
	   Coding	  Instrument	  Definitions	  
1.	  	   Demographics	  	  
a.	  Video	  #/identifier—surgery	  type	  and	  date	  as	  labeled	  on	  CD	  (ie	  Appy_2010)	  
b.	  COMMENTS:	  	   Each	  video	  has	  a	  unique	  name.	  	  Please	  identify	  video	  by	  it’s	  disc	  name.	  	  	  
2.	  	   Communication	  Characteristics	  	  
a.	  Distractions	  –	  only	  patient-­‐specific	  conversation	  can	  occur	  during	  the	  handover.	  	  Examples	  of	  
distractions	  include:	  environmental	  barriers	  such	  as	  noise	  or	  poor	  lighting	  and	  
distractions	  from	  staff	  conversations,	  competing	  interests	  (having	  to	  move	  bed	  
or	  administer	  a	  medication).	  
b.	  Production	  pressure	  –	  refers	  to	  overt	  or	  covert	  pressures	  and	  incentives	  on	  personnel	  to	  
place	  production,	  not	  safety,	  as	  their	  primary	  priority.	  Pressure	  to	  maximize	  the	  
number	  of	  cases	  performed,	  having	  to	  hasten	  the	  anesthetic	  or	  alter	  the	  way	  
the	  anesthetic	  is	  conducted,	  pressure	  to	  avoid	  appearing	  overly	  concerned.	  	  
Institutional	  pressure	  not	  personal	  pressure.	  
c.	  Interactive	  communication	  –	  two	  way	  communication	  between	  the	  outgoing	  and	  relieving	  
anesthesia	  provider.	  	  The	  interactive	  communication	  is	  pertinent	  to	  the	  
patient	  handoff.	  
d.	  Safe	  relief	  timing	  –	  Timing	  was	  appropriate	  for	  safe	  patient	  handoff.	  	  Timing	  is	  considered	  
unsafe	  if	  conducted	  during	  a	  critical,	  task	  dense	  period	  including	  induction,	  
emergence	  or	  while	  the	  patient	  is	  unstable.	  
	  
3.	  	   Handoff	  Content	  	  
a.	  Patient	  identification	  –	  identified	  patient	  by	  NAME	  or	  AGE	  or	  GENDER	   	   	  	  
b.	  Procedure	  –	  identified	  the	  procedure	  being	  performed	   	  	   	  	  
c.	  Allergies	  -­‐	  	  identified	  ANY	  allergies	  (must	  be	  stated	  as	  allergies	  or	  reaction	  to)	   	   	  
d.	  Review	  of	  Systems	  –	  reviewed	  ANY	  body	  system	  OR	  reported	  patient	  as	  healthy	  (no	  issues)	   	  	  
e.	  Medications	  –	  identified	  ANY	  medication	  administered	  OR	  meds	  the	  patient	  is	  taking	   	  	  
f.	  Vital	  signs	  –	  identified	  as	  VSS	  (vital	  signs	  stable)	  or	  ANY	  abnormal	  vital	  sign	  values	   	  	  
g.	  Anesthesia	  technique	  –	  identified	  anesthetic	  administered	  or	  it	  is	  obvious	  from	  the	  handoff	  
report	  
h.	  Airway	  technique/review	  –	  Identified	  airway	  assessment	  OR	  the	  airway	  technique	  performed	  	  	  
i.	  Intake	  and	  Output	  –	  ANY	  mention	  of	  fluids	  administered	  OR	  fluids	  out	  (blood	  loss	  OR	  foley)	   	  	  
j.	  Pertinent	  events	  –	  ANY	  identification	  of	  events	  during	  procedure	  or	  anesthetic	  administration	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VCU	  Anesthesia	  Handoff	  Coding	  Instrument	  
	  
1.	  	   Demographics	  	  
a.	  Video	  #/identifier-­‐-­‐_______________________________	  	  
b.	  COMMENTS:	  	  
	  
	  
2.	  	   Communication	  Characteristics	  	  
a.	  Distractions	  	  -­‐-­‐	  YES	  or	  NO	  	  	  	  	  	   comments________________________________	  
b.	  Production	  pressure	  -­‐-­‐	  YES	  or	  NO	  	  	  	  
	   comments________________________________	  
c.	  Interactive	  communication	  -­‐-­‐	  YES	  or	  NO	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  comments__________________________________	  	  
d.	  Safe	  relief	  timing	  	  -­‐-­‐	  	  YES	  or	  NO	  
comments_________________________________	  
	  
COMMENTS:	  	  
	  
	  
3.	  	   Handoff	  Content	  	  
a.	  Patient	  identification	  	   YES	  	  or	  	  NO	  	  
b.	  Procedure	   	   	  	   YES	  	  or	  	  NO	  	  
c.	  Allergies	   	   	   YES	  	  or	  	  NO	  
d.	  Review	  of	  Systems	  	  	   YES	  	  or	  	  NO	  	  
e.	  Medications	   	   YES	  	  or	  	  NO	  	  
f.	  Vital	  signs	  	   	   	   YES	  	  or	  	  NO	  	  
g.	  Anesthesia	  technique	  	   YES	  	  or	  	  NO	  	  
h.	  Airway	  technique/review	  	   YES	  	  or	  	  NO	  	  
i.	  Intake	  and	  Output	   	   YES	  	  or	  	  NO	  	  
j.	  Pertinent	  events	  	   	   YES	  	  or	  	  NO	  	  	  
	  	  	  COMMENTS:	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Appendix	  C	  
	  Sample	  Size	  calculation	  
One	  Tailed	  Calculations,	  a=0.05,	  B=0.20	  
Lat	  x	  Han	  MED	  Correl	   	  	   	  	   r's	   Cr	   Za	   Zb	   N	  
-­‐0.657	   	  	   	  	   0.207000604	   -­‐0.787516785	   1.645	   0.84	   13	  
Lat	  x	  Han	  MEAN	  Correl	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
-­‐0.61	   	  	   	  	   0.242236025	   -­‐0.70892136	   1.645	   0.84	   15	  
Lat	  x	  Han	  MED	  Spear	  Correl	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
-­‐0.427	   	  	   	  	   0.401541696	   -­‐0.45622195	   1.645	   0.84	   33	  
Lat	  x	  Han	  MEAN	  Spear	  Correl	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
-­‐0.418	   	  	   	  	   0.410437236	   -­‐0.44526613	   1.645	   0.84	   34	  
Two-­‐tailed	  Calculations,	  a=0.05,	  B=0.20	  
Lat	  x	  Han	  MED	  Correl	   	  	   	  	   r's	   Cr	   Za	   Zb	   N	  
-­‐0.657	   	  	   	  	   0.207000604	   -­‐0.787516785	   1.96	   1.28	   20	  
Lat	  x	  Han	  MEAN	  Correl	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
-­‐0.61	   	  	   	  	   0.242236025	   -­‐0.70892136	   1.96	   1.28	   24	  
Lat	  x	  Han	  MED	  Spear	  Correl	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
-­‐0.427	   	  	   	  	   0.401541696	   -­‐0.45622195	   1.96	   1.28	   53	  
Lat	  x	  Han	  MEAN	  Spear	  Correl	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
-­‐0.418	   	  	   	  	   0.410437236	   -­‐0.44526613	   1.96	   1.28	   56	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